Corruption Markets

Vasileva V.M.,

Cand. Sci. (Pol. Sci.), Associate Professor, Political Science Department, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia; Senior Lecturer, Policy Analysis Department, School of Public Administration, M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia,

Vorobyev A.N.,

Research Fellow, Research Scientific Centre for Transport Economics at Institute of Transport Economics and Transport Policy Studies (ITE&TPS), National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia,

DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2015.02.06
ID of the Article: 4968

For citation:

Vasileva V.M., Vorobyev A.N. Corruption Markets. – Polis. Political Studies. 2015. No 2. P. 78-96 (In Russ.) . DOI:


Authors develop a new conceptual approach to the corruption studies and effectiveness of anticorruption regulations of public service. Basing our hypothesis on the study of effective models of conflict of interest regulation, authors assume that there is a “missing factor” in the modern corruption studies. This “missing factor” is a “corruption market”, particularly, its size, type and nature. Conflict of interest regulations’ aim at controlling key channels of corruption behavior, and corruption market in its turn determines prevailing channels of existing corruption behavior. Thus, misidentification of corruption market’s type is the main reason for the failure of anti-corruption policies, no matter how new and effective models are imported. Corruption market’s size is defined as the number and average price of corruption deals. The nature of corruption market depends on the side, setting the final price of corruption deal. Resulting from institutional characteristics of public administration, corruption markets are either seller’s or buyer’s type. Seller’s corruption markets are sensible to the ethic regulations of the public service, and the only effective way of tackling buyer’s corruption markets are “cut-red-tape” reforms and compliance-based regulation of conflict of interest. Type of corruption
market encompasses 3 dimensions: quality of institutions, scope of regulations and degree of regulations. Basing on the introduced model, authors identify and analyze 8 types of existing corruption markets. Each type of corruption market has its own transformational dynamics and, consequently, own opportunities for
anti-corruption policies. A new conceptual model of corruption market evolution is introduced in the article. Transformations of corruption markets depend on several factors. The key factors are personalization of political regime, “new public management” reforms of public administration, populist policies and creation of rentier states, and set up of the Welfare State.

corruption market; corruption deal; quality of institutions; scope of regulations; degree of regulations; conflict of interest; public service; patronage networks; seller’s market; buyer’s market; demand and supply of corruption.

Content No 2, 2015

See also:

Nezhdanov D.V., Rusakova O.F.,
«Political market» as system-forming metaphor of modern political-science discourse. – Polis. Political Studies. 2011. No4

Veber A.B.,
Market, Trade Unions and Wages. – Polis. Political Studies. 1992. No1

Ivanov V.M.,
The State and the Market (Some Aspects of the Theory of Liberalism). – Polis. Political Studies. 1993. No3

Tzvylyov R.I.,
The International Labour Market and Russia (Problems of Intergration). – Polis. Political Studies. 1993. No1

Barsukova S.Yu.,
«Empire», or Farewell to Modernity. – Polis. Political Studies. 2007. No3



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Polis. Political Studies
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