The 6th ISSUE

IN THIS ISSUE
WE OPEN A DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT
"THE GLOBAL CRISIS AND ITS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES".
THE INITIATIVE OF THIS DISCUSSION BELONGS TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE INTERNET-PORTAL "E-POLIS FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS"
AND TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL POLITICAL PROCESSES OF THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.
 

WHAT ARE NATURE AND SCALE OF THE MODERN GLOBAL CRISIS?

IS THIS CRISIS ÎF SYSTEMIC CHARACTER?

HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?

WHAT PHASE OF IT ARE WE FACING NOW?

WHAT IMPLICATIONS MAY IT HAVE ON DOMESTIC POLICY
OF PARTICULAR COUNTRIES AND ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS?

WHICH THREATS DOES IT POSE TO THE EXISTING WORLD ORDER?

WHAT IS THE RISK OF SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
(UP TO REGIONAL WARS) RELATED TO THE CRISIS?

HOW IT IS POSSIBLE TO ALLEVIATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS?

WHAT SHOULD BE THE PRIORITIES OF NATIONAL POLITICS UNDER CRISIS CONDITIONS?

 
TO INITIATE FURTHER DISCUSSION WE SUGGEST TO GET ACQUAINTED
WITH THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS GIVEN
BY RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS VLADIMIR PANTIN AND VLADIMIR LAPKIN.
THESE STATEMENTS ARE BASED ON THEIR PREVIOUS FORECASTS
ON THE TIME OF ONSET AND DEPTH OF MODERN CRISIS.
MANY OF THESE FORECASTS HAVE ALREADY COME TRUE.
Comments, please, send to: esse@politstudies.ru

VLADIMIR PANTIN AND VLADIMIR LAPKIN

HOW LONG IS THE GLOBAL CRISIS GOING TO LAST AND WHAT CONSEQUENCES WILL IT HAVE?

The global financial and economic crisis started in 2008. This crisis is accompanied by serious political shocks in different countries and disfunctions of the previous system of international relations like the emergence of complex problems in relations between Russia and the USA, increasing contradictions between the USA and the Islamic world, the aggravating instability in the Middle East, Africa and in other regions. New dangerous conflicts are emerging, for example between India and Pakistan. The economic and political instability will obviously intensify in the nearest future. When will these shocks come to an end? What will they result in? What should be done in order to mitigate their destructive consequences?
Vladimir Pantin and Vladimir Lapkin, authors of the book "Philosophy of Historical Forecasting: Rhythms of History and Perspectives of World Development in the First Half of the 21st Century" published in Russia in 2006, believe that all these changes are related to the beginning of a phase of great shocks in international politics and world economy which started after 2005. This dramatic phase is a component of rhythms (long waves) of world development, which have been analysed by the authors for a long time. Many of their forecasts, for instance about the successful development of Western countries in the 1990s and about the beginning of global crisis in 2008-2009 have already come true.

TWO QUOTATIONS from the BOOK:

"… We can forecast that, after the political and economic crisis in 2004 - 2005 related to the failure of USA in Iraq, temporary increase of oil prices, devaluation of dollar, etc., some instable growth of world economy will occur in the first part of the current phase of great shocks from 2005 to 2009. However, an instability both in developed and in developing countries will also take place in this period. This first part of the phase of great shocks will lead to a deep world crisis in 2008 - 2010. This world crisis will be a border line in the world political and economic development" (Vladimir I. Pantin, Vladimir V. Lapkin. Philosophy of Historical Forecasting. Dubna, 2006. P. 315).

"The second part of the phase of great shocks corresponds to the period from 2009 to 2013 and the lowest point of this phase falls on 2011 (or, more precisely, 2010 - 2012). Our concept of long waves in international politics and world economy shows that a serious economic crisis will take place near 2009. This crisis will lead to financial collapse, and thereafter many important political events will occur" (Vladimir I. Pantin, Vladimir V. Lapkin. Philosophy of Historical Forecasting. Dubna, 2006. P. 318).

In contrast to works of Alvin Toffler and other famous futurologists, Pantin and Lapkin's book contains precise dates or time intervals when economic crises, internal political shocks and international conflicts are most possible. According to Pantin and Lapkin, severe economic and political shocks will take place in 2009-2011. The crisis (or, more exactly, a number of crises) will be permanent and have large-scale consequences. The lowest point of the cycle will be reached in 2010-2011. The possibility of most dangerous international conflicts reaches the highest level in 2014-2017, since in this period the former system of international relations will be destabilized, and a new one will not have emerged yet. To prevent these conflicts from turning into a new world war, an improvement of relations and closer cooperation among all world-leading actors - United States, European Union, Russia, Japan, China, India, as well as key regional powers of the Islamic world and Latin America - should take place. If such cooperation is not established, vast disruption and victims are possible.
In general, the phase of great shocks will last approximately till 2017. Later on, from 2017 to 2025, the world economy will experience a new rise. At the same time large shifts will occur in the global politics. The leading powers of the so-called "third world", first of all the Oriental countries, will play a more significant role in the international relations while the role of United States is likely to decrease considerably.

In the nearest future we expect to continue publishing materials concerning the analysis and forecast of socio-political consequences of the ongoing global crisis. Besides, we plan to discuss the scale and historical role of the crisis, its possible geopolitical consequences, frames of a new world order which can emerge in the process of overcoming the crisis.

V. Pantin, V. Lapkin
Vladimir Pantin is a professor of the Moscow State University of International Relations (MGIMO), chief researcher of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Vladimir Lapkin is President of the Management Committee of "Political studies" ("Polis") magazine, the leading researcher of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences.

"PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORICAL FORECASTING: RHYTHMS OF HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVES OF WORLD DEVELOPMENT
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 21st CENTURY"
Dubna. Publishing house "Phenix+", 2006

Annotation

This book focuces on inverstigation of the key approaches to society's development forecasting based on analysys of historical development tendencies. It contains examination of problems and perspectives of forecasting in the Arts, analysys of particular forecasts of the greatest philosophers, hisoricians, economists and political scientists, as well as a scientific forecast of Russia and other countries' development in the first half of the 21st century based on the inverstigation of rythmes and cycles of socio-political dynamics.
The book is meant for philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, students and lecturers of humanitarian institutes of higher education and everyone interested in the perspectives of Russian and foreign societies' development.

KEY IDEAS OF THE BOOK

1) The most striking examples of effective forecasts based on taking into consideration waves of economic, social and cultural development are ones such as the forecast formulated by Nikolai Kondratiev in the beginning of the 1920's about the "great crisis" in the 1930's, forecasts of Arthur M.Schlesinger about waves of internal political development of the USA, forecasts of Francis Klingberg about the recurrent rotation of "active" ("extravert") and "passive" ("introvert") periods in the USA foreign policy, the forecast of A.G.Frank about China's economic rise and so on.


2) In the beginning of the 1990's Vladimir Pantin and Vladimir Lapkin developed the model of world economic and political development based on the hypothesis about a consistent multigraded reduction (decrease of length) of Kondratiev cycles' downwaves (the reduction results from a fast overcoming of obstacles for technological and economic development as the world economy grows). Such model made it possible to forecast that in the 1990's the Western countries will develop dynamically and then after 2000 they will enter a period of crises and shocks. These crises and instability are connected with the end of the upwave and beginning of the Kondratiev cycle's downwave, which started early in the 2000's and will last about till 2020.


3) According to this model, the peak of shocks in the world economy will take place in 2009-2013, and the peak of political and military shocks and conflicts in 2013-2017. After 2008 there is a probability of a global financial and economic crisis, which will seriously undermine positions of the American dollar and American economy in general. After 2013 it is very likely that local military and political conflicts will spread and turn into global ones. Some regions may become especially dangerous, among them the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel), the Southeast Asia (China, Taiwan, North and South Korea, Indonesia, Japan), the Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldova, Baltic countries), the Balkan Peninsula (countries which were part of Yugoslavia, and Albania).


4) In light of this perspective responsible politicians and sensible citizens of the USA, Russia and European countries are faced with a task to do their best in order to stop unreasoned (and sometimes crazy) actions of their governments. Therefore it is necessary to prevent modern "information wars" and "cold wars" from developing into real ones. A further enlargement of NATO to the east, new allocations of missiles in the Eastern Europe and in Russia only kindle dissension between Russia and the West, make Russia fear the Western countries and arm itself. History shows that only by uniting together European countries, USA and Russia can effectively withstand such deadly threats to mankind as Nazism, eastern hegemonism, international terrorism, etc. On the contrary, when Russia and the West are involved into confrontation against each other or are separated, they lose this fight.


5) Therefore all attempts to isolate Russia and to "drive it into a corner" lead only to a rapprochement between Russia and China, strenghthen anti-Western sentiments in Russia and aggravate international instability. If Russia enters a deep crisis or disentegrates, that will be no help for Europe and the USA, since they will have to face China and "Islamic world" countries which will gain huge strength. Another danger is proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, which will inevitably fall into the hands of terrorists. The existing disagreements between Russia and the West should be overcome in order to solve the main world problems. Any other policy will result in a stalemate.

6) Heavy world economic and political shocks in 2009-2020 seem to be inevitable. However, their consequences may differ considerably according to the state of relations between Russia and the West. If the Western countries try to push Russia off from taking part in global politics and economics, such policy will lead after all to Russia's disintegration and a deep crisis in the West, which may lead in turn to its decline and rise of the East. If a wiser and more prescient policy triumphs, an alliance between Russia and the West will be established with the world becoming far more stable.

7) Despite à widespread scepticism regarding forecasts and a possibility to foresee the future, an objective and unprejudiced analysys shows that many forecasts made by great philosophers have come true. For instance, forecasts formulated in the first third of the 20th century by Oswald Spengler and Jose Ortega y Gasset about the future integration of Europe and à simultaneous growth of crisis of European culture realized in the late 20th century. In the first half of the 20th century Arnold Toynbee and Nikolai Berdyaev predicted the approaching awakening of "Islamic world" countries, China and India, which would play an increasing role in the world politics. Karl Jaspers foresaw that on the border of the 20th and the 21st centuries mankind will be confronted with a dilemma of choosing either a global empire or a world order based on a relatively free competition of cultures, religions and ideologies.


8) Analysis of Marxism, conceptions of the "end of history" and theories of progressive social development shows that a linear extrapolation of social development tendencies leads, as a rule, to incorrect forecasts. A more productive approach is the one based not only on the forward component of the society's development, but also on its cyclic wave (oscillatory) component. It results from the fact that such a sophisticated system as society is developing nonlinear, with multiple oscillations, zigzags and deviations, which should be taken into account when developing forecasts.

Table of contents

PART I
PHILOSOPHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF FUTURE RESEARCH

Chapter 1. Key problems and principles of forecasting philosophy

1.1. Some methodological problems of future research

1.2. Forecast as a truth criterion of a scientific theory

1.3. Kant and FIchte's philosophy of history: general perspectives of world's development

1.4. Philosophers of history and forecasting. Realised forecasts of Spengler, Toynbee, Soloviev, Berdyaev, Jaspers, Ortega y Gasset

1.5. Philosophic and artistic-intuitive foresight: discernments of Dostoevsky

1.6. Evolutionary paradigm in historical forecasting


Chapter 2. Introduction to the theory of historical forecasting

2.1. The concept of historical forecasting

2.2. Main approaches to historical forecasting: historical comparisons and analogies

2.3. Main approaches to historical forecasting: linear extrapolation of historical tendencies

2.4. Main approaches to historical forecasting: nonlinear extrapolation based on rythmes and cycles of history

2.5. The concept of evolutionary cycle and its application in historical forecasting


Chapter 3. Examples of global development forecasts for the first half of the 21st century

3.1. Forecasts of Alvin Toffler, Immanuel Wallerstein and Samuel Huntington

3.2. Globalisation processes development forecasts

3.3. Other forecasts of global development


PART II
RYTHMES OF HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVES OF WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Chapter 4. Global differentiation-integration rythmes and their role in world development forecasting

4.1. Concept of global development rythmes. Long differentiation-integration waves

4.2. Very long global differentiation-integration waves and their forecasting significance

4.3. Perspectives of world development from the point of view of differentiation-integration rythmes


Chapter 5. The significance of international economic and political system evolution cycles for world development forecasting

5.1. Kondratiev's conception and forecasts of the world-system approach. Distinction of international economic and political system evolution cycles conception

5.2. Forecasting importance of international economic and political system evolution cycles: forecasts, which have already proved to be true

5.3. Forecast of world development for the first half of the 21st century based on international economic and political system evolution cycles


Chapter 6. Rytmes and cycles of Russia's indigenous development

6.1. 36-year cycles of Russia's social-economic development: general description and special role in Russian history

6.2. 36-year cycles structure analysys (1881-2025)

6.3. Rotation cycles of Russian elites

6.4. Significance of 36-year cycles for forecasting of Russia's development in the first half of the 21st century


Chapter 7. Forecast of world development for the first half of the 21st century: key conclusions

7.1. Key forecasts of world development: critical evaluation

7.2. Concluding forecast based on interaction of different rythmes and cycles of world development

7.3. Brief commentary to concluding forecast: is the prognostic model correct?

7.4. Conclusions for Russia

7.5. Historical forecasting: can the future be influenced?