AXIOLOGICAL VS DIALOGICAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

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In the post-Cold War era European politics has taken on an increasingly axiological character. This can be contrasted, to borrow a term from Mikhail Bakhtin, with what can be called a dialogical process. This provides an ontology of European unity based not on the language of common values (although of course not repudiating these values), nor on a Realpolitik reversion to the language of interests (although not neglecting the creation of alliances based on the genuine commonality of concerns), but on a common public sphere based on a communicative process and a substantive idea of a European political community. This potentially provides a way out of the monological trap into which the European Union (EU) and European politics in general have fallen. It would avoid the process where the EU sets itself up as a teacher to others [Prozorov 2006]. This would be a dialogical politics that could transcend the logic of incommensurable duality. It is thus a paradoxical politics, because dialogue assumes a conversation between at least two parties of recognised similar discursive status, and thus substantiates what is still to be established. In the European context it implies the creation of a substantive political community, with recognition of the validity of the political subjecthood of the interlocutor. It is ambivalence over the latter question that has bedevilled Russia’s relations with the EU and the West since the end of the Cold War.

The anti-revolutions of 1989-1991 opened up the potential for a dialogical form of politics, once the axiological structures of the Cold War had been transcended. Instead, the following period has been one of disappointment, as new forms of axiological politics have been imposed. The perpetuation of the ideological structures of the Cold War has given rise to the cold peace [Sakwa 2013]. Claims to sovereign equality have not been matched by the substantive recognition of diversity and recognition of difference. Dialogue entails some sort of binary functionality, but it is also usually based on respect for difference and thus some sort of methodological
equality; a type of unity created by a discussion between equals where the views of the interlocutor are respected and given equal weight. In a monological discourse, one of the parties (or both), considers itself normatively, and thus ontologically, superior to the interlocutor, and thus a series of what I call mimetic relationships are established, including the process whereby one actor sets themselves up as teacher to the other. This monological logic is not only applied between states, but can also characterise relations between state and society within a state. It is not accidental that the Russian protest movement after the flawed elections of 2011/2012 called for “dialogue” with the authorities, but has been met with a monological response.

THE CONCEPT OF AXIOLOGICAL POLITICS

The concept of “axiology” is susceptible to several interpretations. In this paper it will be used to denote a form of politics that is categorical, monological and ideological. Axiological politics assumes that some things have been settled outside of the political process, and thus politics becomes a means for the implementation of a priori positions. Its ideological aspect assumes that answers have already been found to questions of human community. Politics become instrumental, and thus deprived of what many have argued is its agonistic essence: the organised and constrained struggle over fundamental matters of concern in the life of the community. Axiological politics denigrates the political subjectivity of actors, whether individuals, larger groupings or the entire state. It can be both assimilationist and rejectionist.

The notion of course is an ideal type. Public affairs will always contain an irreducible quotient of axiological politics; but the democratic ideal suggests that this can be tempered by the structured engagement of different political subjects in a “communicative” process, as Jürgen Habermas has long argued [Habermas 1984, 1987]. However, dialogical politics differs in some significant respects from Habermas’s communicative interactions. First, it dispenses with the implicit hierarchy of relations in Habermas’s theory, seen so notably in his discussion of post-secularism, where the views of the others are engaged because they exist, but are treated in a condescending manner [see Ratzinger, Habermas 2007]. In other words, the views of the other are to be respected, but essentially they are considered from the perspective of a superior us. Boundaries are reinforced and not challenged. Second, the communicative process is implicitly founded on the idea of settled identities, and thus the problem of liminality is not adequately integrated into the theory. In the case of Russia this is particularly important, since the country in the last two decades has been engaged in an intense process of identity formation, hence it is not a settled interlocutor but has a deeply luminal identity, which remains in flux and is torn by deeply contested representations of the ideal.

The idea of dialogical politics seeks to shift attention from the institutional level, where executives will always seek to achieve axiological outcomes, and where legislatures also by definition engage in some sort of dialogical process, to more fundamental categories dealing with the quality of political relationships and various modes of engagement with the political process itself. At the conceptual level, axiological politics can take several distinct, but typically inter-related, forms. Conspirology is one powerful form of axiological politics, based on victimhood and persecution by malign but often unstated forces. In this paper, however, I will focus on mimesis, which is at the heart of axiological politics.
THREE TYPES OF MIMETIC POLITICS

Mimetic politics take at least three different forms, but all share a root orientation towards an axiological and monological disposition, that is, towards closing down debate and patterns of dialogical interaction. Mimetic politics are based on a distinctive hermeneutics in which one interlocutor places themselves in a privileged position vis-à-vis the other. In both international and internal relations, the autonomous political subjectivity of the other is in overt or covert ways denigrated. The forms of this denigration can again be manifested in many different ways, ranging from outright violence to more subtle attitudes of “othering” and “orientalisation”.

Mimetic violence

The first type is the most basic and truest to the insights offered by René Girard in his various studies of the phenomenon. Mimetic violence is based on scapegoating, the way in which a society can relieve the accumulated tensions through the ritualised application of violence. For Girard, the scapegoating principle is a universal phenomenon, although through the ages it has taken many different forms [Girard, Freccero 1989; Girard 2005]. The process is often the symbolic allocation of responsibility for social ills to a particular subject, who is then deprived off the most basic of rights, the right to life. In common parlance, of course, a scapegoat is more crudely simply a mechanism to direct violence outwards, to find some external “other” responsible for internal contradictions. Girard offers both a problem and a solution, whereas the commonplace definition of the scapegoat simply displaces internal tensions to another plane, without a means for their resolution.

The post-Cold War era is replete with examples of the application of mimetic violence. Indeed, it could well be argued that the essence of the present period of cold peace is essentially constructed on this. On the one side, the failure of the West to resolve its own societal and political problems accentuated the process whereby problems are externalised in the form of some sort of spiritual threat to the West itself. Too often Russia has become the archetypical scapegoat “other”, a form of release of mimetic violence; a way for the West to externalise its own contradictions and to project them on to some sacrificial victim. For Girard this is a classic position in which societal contradictions are projected onto a particular individual or group, and thus prevents the violence engulfing society as a whole [Cowdell 2012]. By externalising violence, the sacred core of a society can be preserved. In the contemporary world the universal principle takes specific forms of application, and is the counterpart of a hegemonic world order. The axiological articulation of a particular set of values is accompanied by the denigration of those who do not unreservedly subscribe to those values in the form in which they are presented. Thus we are faced with the paradox that the collective espousal of what is sometimes presented as the liberal peace functions as a mechanism to exclude those who have not yet matured to the point at which the conventions of the liberal peace can be extended to them².

² See [Cooper 2003], who argues that the normative rules applicable to the zone of peace do not necessarily extend to those not yet encompassed by its values. As he puts it, “For the post-modern state there is, therefore, a difficulty. It needs to get used to the idea of double standards. Among themselves, the post-modern states operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state outside the post-modern limits, Europeans need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era — force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth-century world of every state for itself. In the jungle, one must use the laws of the jungle” (p. 62). This is a classic case of battles over norms acting as a form of mimetic violence.
Russia of course responds with its own forms of mimetic violence. As its own contradictions have accumulated, notably during Putin’s third presidential term, the role of scapegoating has intensified. In the crudest terms, this has meant identifying the West as the source and the inspirer of Russia’s problems. This is accentuated at times of political stress, when the regime finds itself under threat. Thus, the flawed December 2011 parliamentary elections, followed by the largest and most political of demonstrations of Putin’s whole tenure, was accompanied by a virulent response to alleged Western “interference”. This was not without some substance, since the US secretary of state at the time, Hillary Clinton, is recognised for her heavy-handed and simplistic approach to international affairs; yet the campaign clearly had an instrumental purpose, to mobilise core supporters against the “other”, both internal and abroad. The Putinite system of internal political management had never recognised the political subjectivity and autonomy of other political actors, and instead pursued a strategy of depoliticised state management. Managed democracy was unable to entertain a genuine dialogical politics, but by the same token it avoided extreme forms of axiology. The fact that after 2011 the system has relied on axiological forms of political management is an indication of the degeneration of the classical Putinite techniques of regime management.

**Adaptive mimesis**

The concept of mimesis, as noted, can also be applied in other ways. The didactic tone of much Western policy vis-à-vis Russia, and which is embedded in the very premise of the hegemonic political formation known as the “liberal peace”, brings us to the second type. This is what I call adaptive mimesis, in which autonomous political subjectivity is effectively diminished by engagement in “reform”, a code word designating dissatisfaction with one’s own present and the attempt to adapt to some normative standards set outside one’s own developmental experience. For Aristotle, mimesis is the way in which people learn, as a child copies the behaviour of adults and thus is educated in the ways of adults. A child until a certain age is deprived of legal autonomy, and so it is by analogy with states, where political subjectivity, if not political sovereignty, is diminished.

For Russia, which has been locked in a form of catch-up modernisation for generations, this is a particularly salient issue. The whole history of Russia’s engagement with Western modernity has been accompanied by a permanent fear of adaptive mimesis: that its own “authentic” identity would be lost as it not only copied Western models of development but denigrated its own customs. Nevertheless, Russia for several centuries has been a prickly yet eager student, desperate for a learning that would confirm its place in the community of European civilised states. Since Peter the Great opened his “window to the West” the tension between Russia as an adept and as a master has never been reconciled [Malia 2000]. Indeed, this dynamic shapes the modern history of Russia. Even the Bolshevik experiment was at heart an attempt to find a non-exploitative version of Western modernity: seeking to transcend the contradictions while fulfilling the potential that the founding fathers of Soviet-type socialism recognised lay within that modernity. This is the philosophical basis for Putin repudiating the language of “reform” when he came to power in 2000, although for him this no doubt was an intuitive rather than a conceptual response. The later stress on “sovereign democracy”, advanced above all by the Kremlin’s chief ideologist Vladislav Surkov, explicitly rejected adaptive mimesis,
which was considered indeed to have a violent element at its core. The West set itself up as mentor, which could not but reduce the subjectivity of the learner. This helps explain the exceptionally uncomfortable connotations associated with the concept of “democracy” in contemporary Russian political discourse.

**Mimetic simulacra**

Adaptive mimesis, which in typical circumstances of benignly intended “democracy assistance”, can be perceived as the continuation of tutelary violence by other means. This gives rise to the third form of the phenomenon, what I call mimetic simulacra. For Plato mimesis is a form of copying, but it lacks the benign pedagogical impulse that is at the heart of the Aristotelian conception. Mimetic politics is what the West does when it says to the rest of the world that they must copy the West in order to move beyond their current state of infantilism (the Aristotelian version). However, from the Platonic perspective, mimetic politics lacks authenticity since it copies the form but lacks the substance. The revolt against universalising discourses reflects an innate Platonic conception of mimesis as mere imitation and estrangement from truth and reinforces the search for a genuinely original Russian tradition in art and politics. In terms of politics, the introduction of the form at the expense of the substance has produced a particularly lifeless form of politics. Dmitry Furman has talked of “imitative democracy”, in which the social institutions of democracy have been imported, but in the absence of the appropriate socio-cultural life world, they become merely pale imitations of the institutions taken from the West [Furman 2008: 29-47]. As we shall see, simulacrous mimesis can only be challenged by a substantive reinvestment in the politics and the political process.

The adaptive mimesis advanced by the West is countered in Russia by the Putinite regime proposing its own form of tutelary politics. For a time the notion of “sovereign democracy” was the subject of innumerable articles and discussions, but Putin himself was always uncomfortable with the term. By seeking to give a formal conceptual framework for the practices of the regime, his leadership would be constrained and hostage to the philosophical formulations of others. The Putin system operates by accentuating ambiguity and draws its power from applying conventional categories of politics (democracy, elections, constitutionalism), but then rendering them into mimetic simulacra of what would normally be considered the real thing. This form of mimetic politics is implicitly justified by the first two: the ambient mimetic violence projected into the very structure of international affairs by the hegemonic ambitions of the leading Western powers; reinforced by a normative level of interactions, the adaptive mimesis, which suggests that the West knows something that Russia does not — namely how to live in the modern world; and since Russia has not (until recently) considered itself part of the non-West, it adopted the forms of Western modernity, but these have turned into mere simulacrous imitations.

**Political dialogism**

The logic of the transcendence of the Cold War accentuated the monological, and thus axiological, character of contemporary world and European politics. This has entailed a number of mimetic practices, three of which have been identified above. We have entered an era of mimetic politics in which the form is preserved but the substance of what makes politics political has been lost. This is seen at its sharpest in

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3 For a discussion of mimesis, see [Greenleaf, Golburt 2009: 743-757, 744-745].
various forms of axiological politics. At the same time, it would be perverse not to recognize that there is a counter-movement to this axiological style of politics. I label this counter-movement dialogical politics. It seeks to establish a space for autonomy and resistance to the dominance of the social forms of the hegemonic regime at the international and national levels, and seeks to give recognition to the political subjectivity of the “other”.

The substance of a dialogical politics is the recognition of equal political subjectivity for political actors. In international affairs this means overcoming limited sovereignty regimes in favour of the recognition of multiple centres of civilizational and political identity. This is the multipolarity that has long been propounded by Russian leaders, and was argued for by Carl Schmitt in his notion of the pluriverse [Schmitt 2006]. Geopolitics is certainly fundamental to post-Cold War axiology, but dialogical politics entails a double movement: countering the logic of axiological politics in the international sphere accompanied by revalorisation of substantive political community in domestic matters. The two of course are profoundly interconnected, and effectively part of a single process. Contemporary dialogical politics are inspired by a number of ideas and characterized by a number of practices.

The Enlightenment as a project is often considered to have an inherent monological dimension, countered according to some critics by the luxurious pluralism of postmodernity and postsecularity. At the heart of the “monologue of the Enlightenment” is anti-religiosity, which in the end presents an eviscerated representation of individual freedom [Kyrlezhev 2008: 21-31]. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s explorations in “philosophical hermeneutics”, in particular the status of knowledge, had already criticised the attempt to reduce the study of the humanities to the methods of the natural sciences [Gadamer 2004]. Of greater importance for this paper is his work on “dialogue and dialectic” [Gadamer 1980]; as well as essays on “the relevance of the beautiful” [Gadamer 1986]. His focus was on particularity and specificity within a dynamic whole. Another thinker who challenged traditional dialectical thinking is Merleau-Ponty.

These are themes explored by Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin’s thinking applies a study of cultural forms, knowledge and society to provide an original approach to the relationship of the individual and society. I will focus only on Bakhtin’s interpretation of the dialogical. Bakhtin examined the way that humans use language, and advanced a dialogical concept of its use. It is on this basis that Michael Holquist coined the term “dialogism”, a word that Bakhtin never used [Holquist 1990: 15]. Holquist notes Bakhtin’s attraction to the neo-Kantian Marburg school, and in particular the works of Hermann Cohen, for its emphasis on unity and oneness; accompanied by his lifelong preoccupation with the problem of dialogue. The neo-Kantian concern with overcoming the duality between “mind” and “spirit” in Bakhtin’s thinking took a distinctive turn.

In dialogism, the very capacity to have consciousness is based on otherness. This otherness is not merely a dialectical alienation on its way to a sublation that will endow it with a unifying identity in higher consciousness. On the contrary: in dialogism consciousness is otherness. More accurately, it is the differential relation between a center and all that is not that center [ibid.: 18].

4 For an examination of the filiations between postmodernity and postsecularity, see [Caputo 2001].
5 For an excellent biography, see [Clark, Holquist 1984].
For our purposes, the political import is clear: inherent in dialogue is the constitution of distinct subjectivities, with a valance that is innate and not created by the relationship with the central other; although for Bakhtin the self is never an independent construct but “dialogic”, a relation [ibid.: 19]. Hence “Dialogism is a form of architectonics, the general science of ordering parts into a whole. In other words, architectonics is the science of relations”, a permanently dynamic set of ratios and proportions [ibid.: 29]. To put it simply, the self is to society what words are to language [ibid.: 29].

In his studies of Dostoevsky, Bakhtin argues that dialogue is not a means to an end, but is at the core of action itself. The variegated voices constitute a dialogical entity, which is very different from a dialectical relationship. As Bakhtin put it, “Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), remove the intonations (emotional and individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts and judgments from living words and responses, cram everything into one abstract consciousness — and that’s how you get dialectics” [Bakhtin 1986: 147]. Hwa Yol Jung, who cites the above text, comments on this as follows: “Hegel’s ‘theoreticism’ and Marx’s ‘ideologism’ are equally dogmatic because they foreclose history as a movement, as an open future. The open-ended dialogics of difference foster the idea that a multiplicity of differences finds no ending” [Jung 1998: 95-111]. He ends his chapter with the pronouncement: “Mikhail Bakhtin has come of age as a social and political thinker” [ibid.: 107]; and stresses “The pinnacle of Bakhtin’s heterotopia or dialogical body politics is the primacy of the singular Other in all relationships… It is this heterocentric idea that prompts Hans-George Gadamer… to say that the heart of (dialogical) hermeneutics is the possibility that the Other might be right” [ibid.: 108]. Where liberalism and Marxism as the two great political organising principles of our age have clearly exhausted much of their potential to provide intelligibility to our world, let alone an emancipatory and critical drive, dialogism emerges as a new “ism” with creative scope to generate ideas about the substance of political community encompassing heteronomous political subjectivities and sovereignties. In other words, the challenge posed by Linklater to “transform political community” can be addressed by the “thick” practices of political dialogism.

For Kelly, Bakhtin is “representative of a tenuous but robust strand of anti-ideological thought which has survived in Russia from the early nineteenth century through all of the twentieth century and has much potential for the twenty-first” [Kelly 1999: 193]. Her other exemplary representatives of this strain are Herzen and Chekhov. She notes Bakhtin’s concern with practical ethics, and his belief that “human beings could be morally coherent and maximally creative only if they learned to live without the traditional props of faith in absolutes and final certainties”; a view that is indeed at odds with ideologically-informed axiological tenets. For him, “the self is intrinsically dialogical: its viability depends on the quality of its responses to its environment” [ibid.: 195]. As he wrote, “The dialogical nature of our relationship with an evolving environment invalidates the notion of fixed and final truths” [quoted in ibid.: 196]. The dialogic context, moreover has no limits, and can thus be applied as much to politics as to cultural production. There is also a clear politics of resistance inherent in Bakhtin’s argument. “Official monologism”, with its “claim to possession of a ready-made truth has been subverted throughout history by a carnival sense of the world: a grasp of the primal realities of existence — birth, decay, metamorphosis, rebirth, and the impermanence of all human structures and powers” [ibidem]. This
was an incendiary approach in the Soviet context, but the appeal to a dialogical selfhood retains a powerful emancipatory character to this day because of its deep humanistic impulse.

In particular, in his early study of 1919–1921, only published in 1986 with the title of *Towards a Philosophy of the Act*, treating the phenomenology of the individual event and drawing on the same well-spring as Herzen’s most inspired philosophy, Bakhtin studied “the way in which teleological systems and doctrines of progress distort the reality of human participation in the historical process and the nature of moral responsibility” [ibid.: 202]. Bakhtin agreed with Herzen that it was best not to speak of “settled moral norms or systems but of moral creativity — in Bakhtin’s words, “the process of creating the ethical deed”; his term for this is “architectronics” — the shaping of a relationship between the individual and his or her constantly changing natural and cultural environment’ [ibid.: 206]. In other words, there is not only an open-endedness to historical outcomes, but there is a constant negotiation between the self and society in the creation of moral norms. This does not entail a vulgar relativism since this is constituted within an ethics of responsibility and engagement. Neither does it mean alienation from a larger whole, but separation in this framework was not alienation but what Bakhtin called alterity (*drugost’*). Overall, this “emphasis on the unfinalizability of history and human beings stood in radical opposition to the dominant eschatological tendency of Russian thought which looked to some formula — whether sobornost or socialism — for a final resolution of all conflicts between essence and existence, the part and the whole” [ibid.: 208]. This is a vision of society based, as one critic put it, on “the ancient idea of the harmonious wholeness of the Cosmos, which approach the world as ‘the reciprocal supplementarity of unrepeatable individualities’”6. This again stands in contrast to the axiological assumptions embedded in the taxis of much of the transitological literature.

**Towards a New Politics**

The language of “transitology” is thoroughly imbued with an axiological mentality. Societies caught in the toils of accelerated transformation are by definition seen as incomplete and unformed, and thus their political subjectivity is automatically treated as inferior. While Hayek had critiqued the idea of *taxis* (a social order made by design, accessible to human intelligence), to which he counterpoised the idea of *cosmos* (a spontaneously evolving and unplanned social order, not fully accessible to human intelligence), with the socialist projects for human amelioration his main target, it is the post-communist creation of capitalist democracy that ended up being the most spectacular cases of taxis of our time. The political subjectivity of other countries, such as Iran, which have long been engaged with coming to terms with modernity on the basis of civilizational autonomy, are denigrated for rather different reasons — above all their stubborn pursuit of their own form of modernity and the means to defend themselves. As far as Europe is concerned, it is Russia which continues to act as the collective repository for the collective violence, pedagogical aspirations and target of European values.

By exploring the distinction between axiological and dialogical politics, this approach allows a more nuanced understanding of political processes today, at both the domestic and international level. First, the distinction between forms of rule,

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6 G.L. Tulchinsky, cited in [ibid.: 213].
the *forma imperii*, and the mode of rule, *forma regiminis*, allows us to identify one of the most salient features of contemporary domestic and international politics, the intensification of axiological politics. It alerts us to the problem that the style of politics is as important as the formal institutional framework. Equally, even the most “democratic” or “liberal” government or opposition movement can engage in axiological politics (a contemporary example is the Victor Orban government in Hungary), while an ostensibly authoritarian constitution can be managed in a relatively dialogical manner. This has become an issue of increasing concern in the comparative democratisation literature, above all through increased interest in “quality of democracy” issues. Opposition to an authoritarian order is not in and of itself normatively able to transcend axiological tropes. The example, of the Leninist wing of the Bolsheviks is perhaps the best example of this, which applied axiological politics in both opposition and power in extreme forms.

The second key argument of this paper is that the self/other binary can take both axiological and dialogical forms. In the former a range of mimetic methods can be present, including the classic process of self-constitution through the othering of the outsider and the external threat. This process is as characteristic of hegemonic social formations as it is for subaltern states whose identity is protean and role in the world contested. However, this paper has identified a dialogical version of the self/other. In this the political subjectivity of the other is not only respected but also valued, as adding an element of normative diversity to the world or in domestic politics, which can help to establish a healthy environment for the growth and development of the self as much as the other.

Our case was relations between Russia and Europe, where axiological processes are coming increasingly to the fore. Although the EU has invested considerable resources into the relationship, much of this was predicated on the assumption that the various mechanisms of “external governance” would transform Russia from an alien other into some version of us. Thus even at its most benign the EU policy was imbued with a transformative mission that contained the axiological belief that Russia’s exiting political subjectivity was somehow inappropriate and potentially pathological. A more dialogical understanding of the relationship would propose a process in which inadequacies and problems would be treated as matters of common concern, and thus Russia’s historical circumstances and contested identity would not be something to exploit but to be shaped together. The same applies in different ways to domestic politics. The challenge to the Putin administration from late 2011 swiftly assumed axiological dimensions on both sides, closing down the dialogical potential of the situation through the mutual engagement of the regime and the opposition. The fundamental issue is the quality of the relationship between different political subjects.

Overall, the self/other dynamic is constantly evolving, and this paper argues that classical approaches need to be supplemented by a focus on the status of the political subjectivity of the other. This can help avoid the restoration of colonial relations, and opens the way to a theorisation of how new political communities can be established on the basis not just of reciprocity but of recognition of political equality. The dialogical process provides a way of doing this, recognising a permanent dynamic of open-ended interactions. The new ideology of “normative power” or other forms of hierarchising relations can be transcended, and thus de-escalate the growing tensions.

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7 For example, [O’Donnell, Cullell, Iazzetta 2004].
within and between societies provoked by axiological practices. Dialogism may not provide any ready-made solutions, but it provides a key to thinking about the mutual recognition that is essential to avoid a new cycle of confrontation and conflict.

References


