Economic Development Impact of Political Institutions:
a Mechanism of Influence

Linetsky A.I.,

Cand. Sci. (Phys.-Math.), political scientist, businessman,

elibrary_id: 941066 |

DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2016.02.11
For citation:

Linetsky A.I. Economic Development Impact of Political Institutions: a Mechanism of Influence. – Polis. Political Studies. 2016. No. 2. P. 152-170. (In Russ.).


Political institutions historically formed up in a country and being out of the government control may produce a great economic development impact. We argue that an impersonal gear of this impact consists of two inseparable parts: 1) compulsory (predatory) withdrawing of resources and goods from one part of people of a country and 2) arbitrary transferring them to another part of people. The two main features describe this off-market re-distribution process: the total volume of predatory withdrawing and the mode of allocation of its results to the main directions of use. The political system of certain type maintains predatory with drawing and allocation of its results by its own way. The state with hierarchic political system and political groups standing behind this state withdraw so much predatory rent and use it in such a way that it gives no chance for market economic institutions to get full and proper development. At the same time the command economic institutions flourish here, and the national economics becomes a central planning husbandry. The state with political system based on law and on human rights compulsory withdraw a certain volume of resources and goods with the single aim only: to create a full-developed market economic institutions and, hence, to secure supremacy of market in the national economics. Democracy based on universal suffrage plays a very special role in the process: it rather suppresses market institutions development than supports it.

political and economic institutions; hierarchic political system; political system based on law and on human rights; democracy; off-market redistribution of resources and goods; political rent; predatory rent; economic growth; sustainable economic development.

Content No. 2, 2016

See also:

Bezvikonnaya Ye.V.,
Systemico-Synergetic Model of a Political System. – Polis. Political Studies. 2009. No3

Tomashov I.A.,
The year of 2012: russian politics and political professions. – Polis. Political Studies. 2012. No3

Korotaev A.V., Bilyuga S.E., Shishkina A.R.,
Correlation between GDP per Capita and Protest Intensity: a Quantitative Analysis. – Polis. Political Studies. 2017. No2

Bolshakov I.V.,
The culture of russian political actors: a variant of typology. – Polis. Political Studies. 2011. No5

Linetsky A.I.,
Latent lnstitutions: standard behavior patterns occurred spontaneously and their political meaning. – Polis. Political Studies. 2014. No6



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