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The potential of coalition theory in international studies:
the case of climate change coalitions

Chistikova A.A.,

HSE University, Moscow, Russia, ashuranova@hse.ru

elibrary_id: 1137901 | ORCID: 0000-0002-3001-8979 | RESEARCHER_ID: HGD-4804-2022

Article received: 2024.12.05 22:08. Accepted: 2025.04.16 22:08


DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2025.04.08
EDN: ZIKPOO

Rubric: Orbis terrarum

For citation:

Chistikova A.A. The potential of coalition theory in international studies: the case of climate change coalitions. – Polis. Political Studies. 2025. No. 4. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2025.04.08. EDN: ZIKPOO (In Russ.)

This research was carried out under HSE University’s Fundamental Research Program in 2024, with grant funding from the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs.

Abstract

States’ coalition behaviour is a traditional research subject for international relations (IR) science. Each of the key theoretical paradigms provides its own answer as to why coalitions form in international politics. However, with the salience of unconventional security threats in modern era, most IR theories which usually provide a universal scheme of coalition formation cannot fully account for states’ coalition behaviour. In particular, the case of climate change coalitions demonstrates they can form at least on the basis of current political and economic alliances, geographical similarity, regional proximity, etc. This case is also unique since the global security threat is presented by the environment instead of a specific actor or a group; in spite of this, as well as despite the existence of an international climate change regime, international climate politics remains fragmented, with states divided into a number of coalitions. Modern research on the formation and functioning of such coalitions – the phenomena that are essentially international – depart from coalition theory, in spite of it not belonging to the realm of IR theory. This allows us to pose a more general question on whether coalition theory is applicable to international studies, the determination of which is a principal goal of our study. We review the fundamentals of coalition theory, within which we discern “materialistic” and “comprehensive” approaches depending on the variety of factors they take into account while studying coalition behaviour. We further analyze key modern research on our case of climate change coalitions and classify it on the grounds of methods applied, i. e. whether they present game-theoretical or statistical modelling or case studies. We conclude that the coalition theory’s methodological apparatus is useful in filling the lack of research on IRtheorized coalition behaviour, presenting a universalized interdisciplinary framework that allows to assess these processes in a comprehensive manner. Coalition theory is best applied in synergy with IR theories, which in itself poses a significant potential for future theoretical research.

Keywords

coalition theory, climate change coalitions, international climate politics, coalition behaviour, methodology of international studies, materialistic approach, comprehensive approach.

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