print

Nuclear boomerang. There are neither eternal allies, nor perpetual enemies, but only nuclear arms are eternal and perpetual

Arbatov A.G.,

Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Academy of Sciences, Center for International Security, Moscow, Russia, arbatov@imemo.ru

elibrary_id: 73079 | ORCID: 0000-0002-0354-0681 | RESEARCHER_ID: H-5017-2017

Article received: 2025.04.30 21:50. Accepted: 2025.05.28 21:50


DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2025.05.04
EDN: CRHTPU

Rubric: Theme of the issue: Contours of the future in the optics of political science

For citation:

Arbatov A.G. Nuclear boomerang. There are neither eternal allies, nor perpetual enemies, but only nuclear arms are eternal and perpetual. – Polis. Political Studies. 2025. No. 5. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2025.05.04. EDN: CRHTPU (In Russ.)

This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centers of power in the emerging world order”.

Abstract

It has become a platitude that the world is going through the deepest crisis of the nuclear arms control system built over the last sixty years. In February 2026, the term of the New START expires and it is impossible to extend it once again; there is no chance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty entering full legal force; and without these pillars the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will be deeply undercut. Moreover, there is a growing pressure of some vested interests in favor of resuming explosive nuclear tests and transfering nuclear arms to foreign allies and partners. Meanwhile history has provided a number of examples of how the states’ political relations change while the military nuclear technologies stay and turn from “friendly” to “hostile” (China, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and South Africa). Whatever the forthcoming world order becomes as a result of its ongoing transformation, nuclear weapons will stay as one of the main elements of international relations as well as the peaceful atomic energy intertwined with the dual purpose technologies. The future polycentric world will require a much better quality nuclear arms control system than previously, when security problems were the concern of the two superpowers. Donald Trump’s return to power is increasing the uncertainty of the future world order, creating both new opportunities and big risks. In view of the forthcoming renovations, the present comprehensive nuclear arms control crisis must be contained and overcome.

Keywords

nuclear weapons, strategic offensive arms, anti-missile defense, nuclear tests, arms control negotiations, peaceful atomic energy, nuclear deterrence.

Cochran, T., Arkin, W., & Hoeing, M. (1984). Nuclear weapons databook. Vol. I. U.S. Nuclear forces and capabilities. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. Cambridge: Harper & Row.

Collins, J. (1980). U.S.-Soviet military balance. Concepts and capabilities. McGraw-Hill Publications.

Edelman, E. & Miller, F. (2025). No new START. Renewing the U.S.-Russian deal won’t solve today’s nuclear dilemmas. Foreign Affairs, 104(3). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/no-new-start

Fitzpatrik, M. (2016). Asia’s latent nuclear powers. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Routledge; IISS.

Kristensen, H.M. & Korda, M. (2023). United States nuclear weapons. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 79(1), 28-52. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2156686

Newhouse, J. (1989). War and peace in the nuclear age. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

O’Brien, R. (2024). The return of peace through strength. Making the case for Trump’s foreign policy. Foreign Affairs, 103(4), 24-38.

Arbatov, A. (2022). Strategic stability and Chinese gambit. World Economy and International Relations, 66(3), 5-22. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-3-5-22

Arbatov, A. (2024). Nuclear deterrence and disarmament in a polycentric world. Contemporary Europe, 5, 5-20. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.31857/S0201708324050012

Chernyshev, A.K. (2021). Pokoleniye pobediteley. Akademik A.D. Sakharov v Atomnom proyekte SSSR [From the generation of winners. Academician A.D. Sakharov in the USSR Atomic Project]. Sarov: RFYATS-VNIIZHF. (In Russ.)

Grinevskii, O. (2004). Perelom. Ot Brezhneva k Gorbachevu [At the turning point. From Brezhnev to Gorbachev]. Moscow: OLMA-Press. (In Russ.)

Karaganov, S.A. (2024). Age of wars? Article two. What to do. Russia in Global Affairs, 2, 37-52. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6439-2024-22-2-37-52

Orlov V., & Semenov S. (Ed.). (2023). Novaya yadernaya devyatka? Otsenka ugroz rasprostraneniya yadernogo oruzhiya v mire [New nine nuclear powers. Modern threats to nuclear proliferation]. Moscow: PIR-PRESS. (In Russ.)

Shunin, V. (2009). Main stages of creating ballistic missiles in China. Foreign Military Review, 7, 50-53. (In Russ.)

Timerbaev, R.M. (2023). Izbrannoe [Selected works]. Moscow: PIR-PRESS. (In Russ.)

Trenin, D., Avakyants, S., & Karaganov, S. (2024). From restraining to deterring. Nuclear weapons, geopolitics, coalition strategy. Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the HSE University, Institute of Military Economics and Strategy of the HSE University. (In Russ.)

Vinogradov, V. (2006). Lord Palmerston in European diplomacy. Modern and Contemporary History, 5, 182-109. (In Russ.)

See also: