South Korea's «nuclear choice»: analyzing possibilities and consequences

Contemporary changes in the architecture of international security directly affect the balance of power in both Europe and Northeast Asia. The Republic of Korea has historically been co-dependent on the United States and has had to rely on Washington to ensure national security and deter the DPRK. In recent years, there have been growing calls in South Korea to return to the idea of building its own nuclear weapons in response to the growing perception of the North Korean threat. Since 2025, there have been growing concerns in the Republic of Korea about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees, considering the policies of the second Trump administration. Based on historical and contemporary data, the article examines the reasons and chronology of the attempts to develop South Korea’s own nuclear missile program. The paper analyses the discussion of ROK politicians with polarised opinions on the return to the development of nuclear weapons. The findings reveal an increase in support among the South Korean population for building its own nuclear arsenal.The authors examine the technical capabilities of the Republic of Korea to develop nuclear weapons and conclude that South Korea has sufficient scientific, technical and industrial potential to launch a military nuclear program and build carriers. The final part of the article presents possible scenarios of Seoul obtaining nuclear weapons and subsequent challenges for Russia.

Keywords

Republic of Korea, nuclear weapons, USA, Russia, North Korea’s nuclear program, NPT.

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Content No. 6, 2025