Paradigms in arms control
Nikitin A.I.,
MGIMO University; Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, an@inno.mgimo.ru
elibrary_id: 637132 | ORCID: 0000-0003-3509-6893 | RESEARCHER_ID: O-6521-2015
Lodgaard S.,
Independent Researcher, Oslo, Norway, SL@nupi.no

DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2026.04.05
EDN: TWDMIX
Nikitin A.I., Lodgaard S. Paradigms in arms control. – Polis. Political Studies. 2026. No. 4. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2026.04.05. EDN: TWDMIX
This article analyzes a complex of 69 treaties and agreements in the areas of arms control, disarmament, confidence-building measures, and transparency in the military-political sphere. To systematize this array of agreements, it proposes an innovative application of paradigmatic theory of development, shaped in epistemology and applicable to many fields. Groups of basic principles are identified that form six paradigm clusters in arms control, including the paradigms of risk reduction, nonproliferation, limitations without reduction, elimination of quantities and whole classes of weapons, strategic stability, and confidence-building measures. The Russian and Western authors jointly challenge the widespread opinion that arms control “died” in the first quarter of the 21st century. The article distinguishes, on the one hand, between two dozen treaties that have been terminated or have expired, and, on the other, a fairly extensive array of several dozen conventions, treaties, and agreements that remain legally in force and, in whole or in part, continue to regulate international coercive power relations in practice. Numerous agreements, both multilateral within the UN and bilateral, remain in effect, and a forthcoming seventh paradigm in arms control can and should be developed by combining a number of principles borrowed from the previous six paradigms with new principles reflecting contemporary political realities, the evolution of military strategies, and scientific and technological developments.
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