The phenomenon of sustained deterrence in the nuclear powers’ competition
Gromyko Al. A.,
Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, alexey@gromyko.ru
elibrary_id: 250282 | ORCID: 0000-0003-4228-1552 | RESEARCHER_ID: U-7726-2018
Article received: 2026.08.20 09:30. Accepted: 2026.09.03 09:30

DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2026.06.07
EDN: GHPWKV
Gromyko Al. A. The phenomenon of sustained deterrence in the nuclear powers’ competition. Polis. Political Studies. 2026. No. 6. P. 89-105. (In Russ.). https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2026.06.07. EDN: GHPWKV (In Russ.)
This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centers of power in the emerging world order”.
The article examines the phenomenon of ‘sustained deterrence’ as a way of managing the realities of ‘mutually assured destruction.’ It explores the uniqueness of the Nuclear Age due to the revolutionary, absolute nature of nuclear weapons and the resulting transformation in the nature of war. The author traces the evolution in the perception of nuclear weapons as battle-field weapons, and as instruments of coercion and deterrence. The ‘sustained’ character of this particular type of deterrence in the period from the 1960s to 2010 (the signing of the New START) resulted from factors including military-political parity between the USSR/Russia and the USA, a number of international legal and political obligations, bilateral understandings of ‘strategic stability,’ and opposition to the first strike doctrine. At the same time, recognition of a new quality of interdependence between the theories of conventional and nuclear wars led to opposition to the no-first-use doctrine. The author pays particular attention to the dilemmas and paradoxes of sustained deterrence: the problem of multiple decisionmaking centres, moral issues, regional use of nuclear weapons in conditions of doctrinal critical circumstances, etc. The article explores the growing problem of the European layer in the flexible approach doctrine, which threatens to produce in the near future a new missile crisis in Europe against the backdrop of degradation of the architecture of sustained deterrence, fragmentation of the Euro-Atlantic security space and nonlinear strategic decoupling of the US from the European allies. The author argues for drawing on the historical experience of sustained deterrence, this time in the context of growing nuclear multipolarity, clashing interpretations of strategic gaps, including theatre deterrence gap, the lowering of nuclear thresholds and the renewed tendency to conventionalise nuclear weapons. These negative developments provide milieu for an ominous shift from second strike and launch-on-warning postures to pre-emptive strikes.
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See also:
Arbatov A.G.,
Nuclear boomerang. There are neither eternal allies, nor perpetual enemies, but only nuclear arms are eternal and perpetual. – Polis. Political Studies. 2025. No5
Mizin V.I., Sergeev V.M.,
Modern Concepts of Strategic Stability. – Polis. Political Studies. 2018. No5
Arbatov A.G.,
Nuclear reloading and international security. – Polis. Political Studies. 2011. No3
Samoylovskaya N.A.,
On the prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments: between fear and doubt. – Polis. Political Studies. 2023. No6
Sorokin K.E.,
Nuclear Weapons in the Era of Geopolitical Multipolarity. – Polis. Political Studies. 1995. No4

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